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JOHNJ. MIDGLEY,JR.* 
SELF-DESTRUCTION: THE DISINTEGRATION AND DECAY 
OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY DURING THE VIETNAM 
ERA. By CINCINNATUS. New York: Norton, 1981, 288 pp., $15.95, 
cloth. 
The moral and ethical implications of military structure and doctrine are 
seldom primary concerns in discussions of security policy. President Carter 
sought to emphasize the importance of moral and ethical considerations in 
foreign policy when he spoke of "a quiet strength based not merely on the size 
of an arsenal, but on the nobility of ideals." 1 Yet, the ethical status of the na-
tion's armed forces - the ultimate instruments of foreign policy - usually 
receives far less public scrutiny than technical or budgetary issues. In a well-
researched and provocative study, Cincinnatus2 explores the manifestations 
and causes of what he considers the ethical and moral decay of the United 
States Army in Vietnam. He also offers some policy prescriptions to remedy 
the Army's alleged ills. 3 
The approach and the conclusions of Cincinnatus's study are not entirely 
new. Richard Gabriel and Paul Savage offered a similar description of the 
Army's post-Vietnam travails in 1978, observing that "[t]he [U.S.] Army in 
Vietnam had literally destroyed itself."4 Several other civilian and military 
authors have also attempted to explain the Army's defeat in Vietnam in moral 
• John J. Midgley, Jr. is a graduate of the United States Military Academy. Currently, he is 
studying at The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. 
1. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1977, at B1, col. 1. 
2. The author invokes the pseudonym of the respected Roman citizen-solider L. Quinctius 
Cincinnatus, who was gi\len dictatorial powers by the Senate to repel the invading Aequi in 458 
B.C. Cincinnatus completed his mission, voluntarily surrendered his authority to the Senate, and 
returned to his farm. R. E. Dupuy AND T. Dupuy, THE ENCYCWPEDIA OF MILITARY HISTORY 
34 (1970). A report in The New York Times revealed that the author is Dr. Cecil B. Currey, a pro-
fessor of American military history at the University of South Florida. The publisher reportedly 
used the pseudonym to enhance the book's credibility by concealing Dr. Currey's service as a 
reserve chaplain and lack of experience in Vietnam. Mitgang, Chaplain is Revealed as Author of Book 
on Vietnam, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1981, at 15, col. 1. 
3. L. Q. CINCINNATUS, SELF-DESTRUCTION: THE DISINTEGRATION AND DECAY OF THE 
UNITED STATES ARMY DURING THE VIETNAM ERA (1981) [hereinafter cited as CINCINNATUS). 
4. See R. GABRIEL & P. SAVAGE, CRISIS IN COMMAND 7 (1978) [hereinafter cited as GABRIEL & 
SAVAGE). 
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or ethical terms.5 Nevertheless, Self-Destruction is an interesting addition to the 
literature, although not for the reasons the author intended. 
By relying heavily on internal Army reports and publications, and by 
quoting anonymous personal interviews with Vietnam veterans, Cincinnatus 
adds some new dimensions to the evidence used by these earlier authors. He 
uses a conceptual framework for explaining the alleged moral decay of the of-
ficer corps which can be distinguished clearly from that of other authors. 
However, flaws in this framework lead Cincinnatus to policy recommenda-
tions which are neither compelling nor practical. Thus, despite its con-
siderable expository value, Self-Destruction is likely to produce only "a quiet 
yawn"6 within the military hierarchy. 
Self-Destruction asserts that American military leaders did not adequately 
know the enemy. This inadequacy prevented them from adopting the tactics 
and strategy needed for victory;7 the result was defeat in Vietnam. Cincin-
natus concludes that an ethical malaise within the professional officer ranks 
caused this failure. 8 
The author takes an approach which is highly anecdotal and loosely 
organized. However, several clear lines of argument emerge. After a brief 
history of Vietnam, Cincinnatus argues that the Army's ignorance of the 
strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare was a central factor in the failure of the 
war effort.9 While not recounting many specifics from the lessons that should 
have been learned, he observes that the Army's role in the Indian Wars, and 
the histories of particular units could have provided valuable guidance to 
generals willing to learn. to He charges that military leaders neglected the 
thoughts of Sun Tzu and Mao Tse Tung who had systematically laid out the 
precepts of guerrilla warfare in detail. Moreover, these leaders were equally 
oblivious to the social and cultural sensitivities of the Vietnamese people. As a 
result, according to Cincinnatus, the Army reaped a reward of "AWOL's, 
fraggings, drug problems, combat refusals and the resignation of its best and 
brightest. "11 
Cincinnatus notes, however, that a significant amount of military literature 
on the war was available and widely read. Works such as Taber's War of the 
Flea12 were circulated within military organizations. The large number of 
5. Among the best of these studies are, s. LOORV, DEFEATED (1973) [hereinafter cited as 
LOORV) and W. HAUSER, AMERICA'S ARMY IN CRISIS (1973). 
6. CINCINNATUS, supra note 3, at 168. 
7. Id. at 9. 
8. /d. at 184. 
9. Id. at 37-41. 
10. Id. at 35. 
11. Id. at 40. 
12. Su R. TABER, WAR OF THE FLEA: A STUDV OF GUERRILLA WARFARE, THEORV ANDPRAC-
nCE (1965). 
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military officers quoted by Cincinnatus demonstrates that the subtleties of 
courneriniurgency were understood at a conceptual, if not operational, level 
by a significant fraction of military professionals. Cincinnatus himself claims 
that "literally hundreds' '13 of senior officers serving in Vietnam believed that 
the general Army approach to the war was flawed. Thus, Cincinnatus's claim 
that ignorance led to poor military policy is contradicted by his own evidence. 
Cincinnatus's characterization of the Army's failure to know the enemy 
reveals two fundamental weaknesses in his analytical framework. First, Selj-
Destruction portrays an anthropomorphic Army which makes decisions and 
changes directions autonomously in spite of some of its leaders who apparently 
understood the problems they faced. Examples of this characterization are 
presented throughout the book. These examples are most highly developed in 
Cincinnatus's argument that the war became a laboratory in which soldiers 
could gain experience and technicians could produce new weapons and equip-
ment. 14 Cincinnatus solidly documents the incidents and policies that pro-
duced these conclusions. Although most observers would agree the military 
presents formidable bureaucratic obstacles to effective control, when Cincin-
natus searches for the cause of the Army's misdirection, he settles on the per-
sonal attributes of General Westmoreland. 15 The implication of this argument 
is that a commander" more interested in, or more capable of controlling such 
things"16 would, in future conflicts, overcome the bureaucracy and wage war 
more effectively. Cincinnatus's theory that better individual leadership would 
automatically produce a better Army neglects the possibility that structural 
reforms may be necessary for a successful leadership climate. Other writers 
have argued that the nature of the current military structure, rather than the 
quality of the leaders within it, is responsible for the symptoms of the ethical 
decay detailed in Selj-Destruction. 17 Cincinnatus is less persuasive than these 
other writers because he thoroughly documents the frustrations of many of-
ficers who attempted to change the direction of military policy in Vietnam. 
A second serious shortcoming in Cincinnalus'~ TVeltult~dtuuung is his lack of 
appreci<ltion for the incremental and evoluntionary nature of military policy 
development in Vietnam. Selj-Destruction consistently portrays the military's 
approach to the war in Vietnam as the invention of Generals Westmoreland 
and Dupuy,18 as if American policy originated with Westmoreland's assump-
tion of command in 1964. It contains no significant discussion of the military 
and diplomatic perspectives formed about the war as early as the Geneva Final 
13. CINCINNATUS, supra note 3, at 52. 
14. !d. at 65-69. 
15. !d. at 69. 
16. !d. at 69. 
17. GABRIEL & SAVAGE, supra note 4, at 84. 
18. CINCINNATUS, supra note 3, at 64. 
1981] UNITED STATES ARMY DURING VIETNAM 485 
Declaration or Dulles's attempts to establish SEATO. 19 These early perspec-
tives are important, for they might help to explain, even if they do not excuse, 
the attitudes and actions of key decision-makers. Cincinnatus not only avoids 
incorporating these perspectives into his analysis, he discounts their value by 
asserting that the leading military men were simply too close-minded and too 
self-assured. 20 Regardless of their personal psychology, American leaders were 
required to operate in an evolving political environment which had to shape 
their views to some degree. The effects of these external factors are difficult to 
analyze; Cincinnatus has apparently left the task to future scholars. 
The notion that the Vietnam War was lost because of the incompetence and 
unethical behavior of individual leaders forms the second major thesis of Self-
Destruction. In a strictly military sense, the statement is a tautology since com-
manders are traditionally considered personally responsible for the successes 
or failures of their units. Charges of poor leadership in Vietnam are certainly 
not new. Ten years ago, for example, Colonel David Hackworth, who left the 
Army in 1971 after commanding troops in Vietnam, publicly argued that inef-
fective leadership was the root cause of the Army's plight. 21 
Cincinnatus observes that no general officers resigned in protest against 
military policies in Vietnam. 22 He also points out that the highest duty of a 
commander is to inform the political leadership when military means are inap-
propriate for the state's political ends. Thus, he concludes that the silent ac-
quiescence of senior officers resulted in inadequately equipped and poorly 
organized units which were unable to function in the national interest. 23 Cin-
cinnatus appears to believe that a military debacle would be less likely if 
general officers were willing to resign their commissions when confronted with 
objectionable policy alternatives. 
This view, while intrinsically appealing, is short-sighted and simplistic, 
because it does not explore the relationship between moral judgments and pro-
fessional military judgments. Cincinnatus retrospectively condemns practices, 
such as search-and-destroy tactics and the excessive use of artillery fires, but 
he does not make clear whether military leaders or their civilian superiors cast 
these or other military policies in ethical terms. The military efficacy of these 
methods, and the professional judgments which produced them, can be 
legitimately criticized. Cincinnatus, however, provides no ethical touchstone 
for military policy, and this missing standard makes the analysis of any 
19. For a general discussion, see G. KAHIN & J. LEWIS, THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM 
(1967) [hereinafter cited as KAHIN & LEWIS]. 
20. CINCINNATUS, supra note 3, at 106. 
21. See D. Hackworth, Affl!)' Leadersh.p Is Ineffective, Washington Post, Jun. 24, 1971, at F6, col. 
1. 
22. CINCINNATUS, supra note 3, at 60. 
23. /d. at 55-60. 
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specific policy completely subjective. Yet, this analysis is of central importance 
because military policy was shaped by the decisions of leaders acting on their 
perceptions of military capability and necessity as well as by ethical concerns. 
Gabriel and Savage note, for example, that some officers may have chosen not 
to resign because of their desire to effect policy changes from within the 
military structure. 24 Self-Destruction provides no ethical yardstick for measuring 
these kinds of motivations. 
Cincinnatus proposes that the failure of military policy to support the na-
tional interest was the only objective basis for officer resignation. 25 However, 
these interests with respect to Vietnam constantly evolved and shifted. 26 Cin-
cinnatus notes that President Johnson and General Westmoreland were in 
agreement on the Army's missionY But, by 1968, little agreement existed on 
war aims or Army missions anywhere in the government. 28 Cincinnatus is 
silent on the proper course for military leaders confronted with imprecise 
political goals, although this problem represents the reality faced by senior 
military leaders in Vietnam. 
Cincinnatus argues that a tendency for Army officers to assume a 
managerial role, rather than a more traditional combat leadership role, under 
General Westmoreland, produced an excessive reliance on statistics and high 
technology.29 In the public mind, statistics and high technology characterize 
the Vietnam war. Cincinnatus offers the macabre "body count" as the best 
example of the unethical manifestations of military leadership in Vietnam. 
The abuses cited are well documented and the discussion of misapplications of 
technology also contains some valuable lessons. However, a more balanced ac-
count might have given some weight to the pervasive influence of Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara, whose early efforts to introduce quantitative 
techniques produced much of the trend criticized in Self-Destruction. 30 
Substantive change was impossible for the Army, according to Cincinnatus, 
because commanders were isolated from the actual situation in the Viet-
namese countryside. Commanders, in this isolation, developed an unsuccess-
ful pacification program and prolonged ground operations. 31 The documenta-
tion of these arguments is interesting and compelling, but Cincinnatus returns 
to the theme of personal incompetence to explain the Army's ills. However, 
24. GABRIEL & SAVAGE, supra note 4, at 115. 
25. CINCINNATUS, supra note 3, at 58-59. 
26. See generally KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 19. 
27. CINCINNATUS, supra note 3, at 52. 
28. See H. KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS 227-33 (1979). 
29. CINCINNATUS, supra note 3, at 86-97. 
30. In 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara stated that "[e]very quantitative 
measure we have shows that we are winning this war." See KAHIN & LEWIS, supra note 19. His 
statement was foUowed a few weeks later by the Buddhist uprisings at Hue. [d. 
31. CINCINNATUS, supra note 3, at 104-19. 
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his sources, especially Kinnard,32 (who is quoted no fewer than twenty-six 
times in Self-Destruction) indicate that many officers were fully cognizant of the 
actual situation facing the Army. If his sources are correct, Cincinnatus has 
documented a policy that developed as a result of informed judgments rather 
than ignorance. Pacification and nation building did not fail because leaders 
misunderstood the policies, but because - for reasons unexplored - the 
leaders were unable to make the policies work. The difference in interpreta-
tion carries significant implications for military policy; but Cincinnatus 
neglects them. 
Self-Destruction prescribes a variety of solutions to prevent the Vietnam 
misfortune from recurring. 33 While his prescriptions range from enlarging the 
role of the Army Reserve to revising the military efficiency reporting system, 
Cincinnatus apparently attaches the greatest importance to two specific in-
itiatives. 
First, he calls for a computer based effort to assemble and codify the lessons 
of the Army's military experience. 34 According to Cincinnatus, such a com-
pilation would aid military planners in making the cost of involvement in 
specific regions clear. Further, this information would enhance the early train-
ing of recruits. Cincinnatus aims his second major recommendation at im-
proving the ethical and moral quality of the officer corps. He suggests the 
establishment of a Defense Ethics Institute modelled after the Defense Race 
Relations Institute, to promote steady changes of attitudes and long-term im-
provements. 35 
Neither initiative would seem to hold much promise if Cincinnatus's char-
acterization of the Army's ills is correct. He presents evidence that computer 
based efforts do not, in fact, work. Self-Destruction cites scores of military and 
civilian studies, including efforts by computer-equipped organizations, which 
were never translated into effective policy. Cincinnatus seems to shift posi-
tions on this idea. He first argues persuasively against the application of 
technical solutions to political and sociological problems; he then retreats to 
the position he originally opposed. This shift is both mystifying and disap-
pointing. 
The notion of a Defense Ethics Institute seems equally unpromising, 
although it reflects Cincinnatus's view that military ethical problems are 
rooted in the weak ethical values of individual military leaders. Gabriel and 
Savage possibly characterize the situation more correctly as a failure of the Ar-
my as an organization to develop an ethical milieu supportive of individual 
32. See D. KINNARD, THE WAR MANAGERS (1977). 
33. CINCINNATUS, supra note 3, at 165-89. 
34. !d. at 169. 
35. !d. at 180. 
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ethical concepts. 36 Cincinnatus's failure to address the organizational and 
skUctu"ral obstacles to ethical conduct is a predictable consequence of his 
dependence on personal interviews in his research. 
Even if his premise is correct, Cincinnatus's analogy between ethical and 
racial problems is flawed. Loory has noted that the awareness fostered by the 
Race Relations Institute was productive only when accompanied by major 
structural changes. Following these suggestions the Navy, for example, made 
over two hundred specific program changes in its attempts to defuse racial ten-
sions in the early 1970's.31 Ethical awareness unaccompanied by similar in-
itiatives could turn the potential for progress into a purely academic discus-
sion. By failing to make the proposal for institutional change within the Army, 
Cincinnatus vitiates much of his recommended policy. 
Self-Destruction is a useful overview of the problems faced by the Army as a 
result of the Vietnam War. The excellent bibliography will be useful to re-
searchers with access to military libraries. Cincinnatus's view of military prob-
lems is insightful, but his inability to prescribe practical solutions is testimony 
to the difficulties confronting military policymakers. Self-Destruction is a 
thought provoking work of real importance. Any reader concerned with the 
role of military professionals in the formulation of national policy should read 
it. 
36. GABRIEL & SAVAGE, supra note 4, at 104. 
37. LOORY, supra note 5, at 161. 
